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Following the events of September 11, President George W. Bush shifted his approach in support 
of further involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. He delivered, on June 24, 2002, a speech in support of 
the creation of “a peaceful and democratic” Palestinian state alongside Israel. Bush specifically asked 
the Palestinians to reform the Palestinian Authority, dismantle their militant groups and elect a new 
leader. Bush also backed the Quartet’s Road Map formula (sponsored by the U.N., the E.U., and 
Russia) for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Bush’s vision and the Road Map plan 
marked a new shift in U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue, both failed to exercise leverage upon Israel 
to withdraw from the Palestinian territories. They failed to provide details concerning the final status 
issues, including the future of Jerusalem, the refugees, Jewish settlements, statehood and borders, 
which served to satisfy Israel’s objection to packaged deals that may entail pressures for withdrawal 
from the Palestinian territories. While exploring factors, events and forces that may have motivated 
Bush’s plans for the region, this article will underline the main themes of his two states idea and those 
of the Road Map’s formula. It also examines signs of inconsistencies and fluctuations in Bush’s policies 
towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, along with comparing Bush’s rhetoric on the Palestinian state 
to the actual realities on the ground. This article seeks a historically grounded critical understanding 
of U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general and the Bush Administration’s 
conception of the two states solution in particular. It also reflects slightly on signs of continuities 
and/or changes experienced during Barak Obama’s presidency with regard to the Middle East region. 
 





As a candidate, President George W. Bush argued against expanding U.S. involvement in 
nation-building efforts around the world. However, the events of September 11
th
 shifted 
Bush’s approach in support of further involvement in the Middle East at many levels, among 
them, the “war on terror,” democracy promotion, and Israeli-Palestinian relations. In the first 
two years of his presidency, Bush proposed a peace plan for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict on the basis of a two-state formula. He explained that in a speech delivered on June 
24, 2002, which was based on an earlier speech made at the U.N. General Assembly in 2001, 
in support of the creation of “a peaceful and democratic Palestinian state alongside Israel” 
(Bush, 2002). President Bush demanded from the Palestinians to reform the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), dismantle all Palestinian militant groups and elect new leaders to head the 
PA. In 2003, President Bush also backed the Quartet’s Road Map formula (sponsored by the 
U.S, the U.N., the E.U., and Russia) for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both the 
two-state idea and the Road Map plan were also sponsored by President Barak Obama 
Administration as the basis for the ongoing peace negotiations taking place between Israel 
and the Palestinians. 
Bush’s plan and the Road Map formula were rooted in earlier understandings formulated 
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at the Madrid Conference in 1991, the principle of land for peace, the UNSC Resolutions 242 
and 338 along with other subsequent peace efforts, including the Oslo Accords and Saudi 
Crown Prince Abdullah’s plan, which was adopted by the Arab Summit held in Beirut in 
March 2002. Bush’s explicit backing, for the first time in U.S. history, of an independent 
Palestinian state has been particularly significant. Previous U.S. plans, including the Oslo 
Accords, had neither called for the creation of a Palestinian state nor did they consider Israel 
as an occupying force or viewed Israel’s settlements as illegal. However, this new policy has 
been more rhetorical than actual (Khalidi, 2013).  
Although Bush’s two states plan and the Road Map marked such a new shift in U.S. 
policy in the region, both proposals failed to exercise U.S. leverage on Israel to halt its 
settlement expansion in the Palestinian territories. The Bush Administration had instead, 
focused its efforts more on delivering Palestinians compliance with Israel’s security demands 
while downplaying Palestinians’ national claims. The two plans also failed to provide details 
concerning the final status issues, including the future of Jerusalem, the refugees, settlements, 
statehood and borders (Malley, 2002). Israel’s objection to packaged deals, while insisting on 
direct negotiations to resolve final status issues, may have been the main reason behind the 
broadness of such documents. Having left the final status issues for future direct negotiations 
between the two sides was alarming for Palestinians, fearing a repeat of past failures 
experienced at the Camp David II Summit. Bush’s two-state plan and the Road Map formula 
could have perhaps become more significant had they incorporated the results of talks that 
were reached at Taba and Geneva during the end of the Clinton Administration (Pressman, 
2003). The Geneva talks, conducted between the Israeli opposition and Palestinian officials, 
were removed from public debates after Israel began initiating its unilateral disengagement 
plans for the territories, namely with regard to the Gaza Strip (Shikaki, 2004). 
Israel’s increasing concerns with what it considers as a demographic threat to its Jewish 
identity, which is attributed to the growth of the Palestinian community within Israel’s 
borders, may have also motivated Israel and the U.S. into backing the two states idea. This 
concern, and perhaps exaggerated fears of Palestinians, may have also enticed the current 
Israeli government into insisting on declaring Israel as a Jewish State for the Jewish people 
worldwide, thus endangering the political status of its Arab minority. Typically, in past 
mediation efforts in Israeli-Palestinian relations, the U.S. have almost always expressed 
opposition to the notion of a Palestinian state, while favoring assimilating Palestinians into 
surrounding Arab countries, notably Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Israel, supported by the U.S., 
has historically rejected Palestinian claim to national self-determination within any part of 
historic Palestine (Shlaim, 2000). Bush’s acceptance of the two-state idea has, in this context, 
been considered a turning point in the U.S. handling of Israeli-Palestinian relations. In actual 
conduct however, President Bush placed Palestinians national claims within an already 
entrenched U.S.’s pro-Israeli “frame of reference” (Christison, 2001). Bush’s supporters and 
critics have at the same time been initially confused by his explicit support for a Palestinian 
statehood, when he was aligning himself with extremist U.S. and Israeli views on Palestinian 
and Arab causes.  
One of the accounts that may also explains the Bush Administration’s acceptance of the 
two states plan has been rooted in policies and actions that were expressed by Israel towards 
the Palestinians (Khalidi, 2013). For instance, since taking office in 2001, Ariel Sharon’s 
government sought to isolate the Palestinians from Israel by confining them within 
manageable limits strengthened by a separation wall, special highways, and checkpoints. By 
limiting the Palestinians within the boundaries of their own isolated towns and cities, along 





with barring them from entering Israel, the Israeli government began expressing readiness to 
give up control over most populated centers in the Palestinian territories and abandon its past 
strategies that entailed the transferring of Palestinians into surrounding Arab countries or 
leaving them under Israel’s indefinite military rule. To accommodate Israel’s demographic 
and territorial concerns, the Bush Administration assured Israel that the support of a 
Palestinian state would not undermine Israel’s settlements blocs or Israel’s security concerns. 
The Obama Administration followed the same approach vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian 
relations, where it overemphasized Israel’s security at the expense of Palestinian claims 
(Campbell, 2012). 
The following discussion underlines the key themes of Bush’s two states plan and those 
of the Road Map formula. It explores signs of inconsistencies, double-standards and 
fluctuations in the Bush Administration’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The 
purpose is to seek a critically grounded understanding of the Bush Administration’s failure to 
resolve the conflict and conclude a lasting agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. 
The article concludes that the policy direction of the Bush Administration, along with that of 
the Obama administration, has been unfavorable for the Palestinians. 
 
 
2. PRESIDENT BUSH’S LEGACY ON THE PEACE PROCESS 
 
2.1 The Two States Plan 
 
The failure of the Clinton Administration to set up an agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians at the Camp David II Summit in 2000 may have caused President Bush’s 
reluctance to risk his prestige in similar mediations during his first term in office. Instead, 
Bush, his Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, 
Secretary of State Collin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Defense 
Deputy Paul Wolfowitz have all endorsed the position of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and 
adopted a “hands-off” approach to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians (Freedman, 2003). 
They viewed Israel as a participant on the side of the U.S. in carrying out the “war on terror” 
strategy. By advancing the use of U.S. military power to promote moral principles in foreign 
policymaking, as expressed by neo-conservative trends in the U.S., the Bush administration 
justified Israel’s excessive use of force against Palestinians as a means to achieve its own 
peace and security. Only after the political support of Arab regimes was needed when the 
U.S. toppled Saddam’s regime did the Bush administration begin, after consulting with Israel, 
revealing the two states vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Bush also 
launched the democracy promotion plan as part of reinventing the causes for the Iraq war, 
given the administration’s inability to locate the weapons of mass destruction in the country. 
Bush finally delivered, in June 2002, a much anticipated speech calling upon the two sides to 
accept his vision of “two states living side by side in peace and security.” Bush warned that 
his two states proposal provides “an opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace” 
across the region and “a test to show who is serious about peace and who is not” (Bush, June 
24, 2002). 
Bush’s two states plan was initially revealed on November 10th, 2001 at a speech 
delivered by President Bush at the U.N., where he invoked, for the first time in U.S. history, 
the endorsement of a democratic Palestinian state alongside Israel. Bush anticipated “the day 
when two states-Israel and Palestine-live peacefully together within secure and recognized 
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boundaries” (New York Times, Nov. 12, 2001). Although Bush was critical of the PA and 
called for the ousting of Yasir Arafat and the election of a new leadership, the PA overlooked 
such comments and welcomed Bush’s support for their state. Israel also accepted Bush’s call 
for the creation of a provisional Palestinian state, only if and when it meets Israeli standards. 
Of course, the Benyamin Netanyahu’s current coalition government believes that the present 
circumstances remains not yet suitable for the establishment of a Palestinian state that would 
threatens Israel’s security concerns.  
Bush identified, in the June 2002 speech, the basic content and procedures that must be 
considered in order for the two states vision to be fulfilled within three years. He stated that 
the Palestinian people must elect “new leaders,” and establish “new institutions and new 
security arrangements with their neighbors.” He identified the Palestinian state “sovereignty” 
as “provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement.” On the Israeli side, Bush argued 
that in order for Israel to preserve its Jewish and democratic identity, it must “take concrete 
steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state. Ultimately, it is up to 
the Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate a settlement that would resolve and put an end to 
their conflict” (Bush, June 24, 2002). The Bush administration believed that only after the 
Palestinians accomplished their expected duties, and after Israel responded favorably to them, 
the two states solution would then be pursued, where Israel and Palestine could negotiate 
directly the details of their agreement. Bush’s demands were viewed as difficult, if not 
impossible, to implement given the Palestinians’ inability to function freely under Israel’s 
military rule of their territories. Also, Israel has been unwilling to stop its settlement 
activities and land confiscation in the Palestinian territories. While justifying Israel’s 
settlement policies and its use of force against the Palestinians, Bush only expected the PA to 
de-legitimize Palestinians’ resistance to Israel.  
Along with the security issues that Israel and the U.S. have raised with regard to the 
Palestinians, the Bush administration also suggested that the spread of democracy in the 
region as a necessary condition for the success of a future Palestinian statehood. Bush’s 
fixation with democracy promotion placed the notion of a Palestinian statehood on hold until 
surrounding Arab autocratic regimes become democratic. Democracy promotion plans have, 
in this context, served not only as a means to prevent Israel’s withdrawal from the territories 
but also to distract attention from Israel’s policies on Jewish settlements. Israel’s supporters 
have used such arguments to suggest that the Arab region must meet certain standards of 
democracy and tolerance towards Israel in order to determine the creation of a future 
Palestinian state. Strangely, democracy has never been used as a precondition for 
establishing Israel or any other state in any part of the world for that matter. On the issue of 
Palestine, it was argued by the Bush Administration, along with many Israeli officials, that a 
democratic Palestinian state is unlikely to be established as long as the other surrounding 
Arab countries remain autocratic, authoritarian and perhaps despotic. 
Neo-conservative members of the Bush Administration portrayed autocratic Arab 
regimes as obstacles to peace and democracy promotion in the region. Ironically, in his 
support for a provisional Palestinian state, Bush urged Jordan’s King Abdullah and 
Mubarak’s of Egypt to work together with the PA “to create a new constitutional framework 
and a working democracy for the Palestinian people.” These conflicting messages continue 
to thwart U.S. credibility in the Arab world. With no fear of contradicting himself, while 
warning the Palestinians that their state “will never be created by terror,” Bush supported 
Israel’s right “to defend herself.” (Bush, 2002). In so doing, Bush has created a flexible 
definition of the meaning of success, where Israel and the U.S. can always contest their 





demands claiming that they were not met. Bush’s double standard approach to Israel and the 
Palestinians was also reflected in expressing sympathetic language of support for Israeli 
victims of Palestinian violence but none for the Palestinian victims of Israel’s violence. Bush 
simply considered Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians to be similar, if not the same, to the 
U.S.’s war against global Islamists.  
Calling upon Israel to support the emergence of “a viable Palestinian state,” Bush 
acknowledged that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be resolved through military 
means. Bush also assumed that Israel’s military occupation since 1967 would be expected to 
end through direct negotiations with the Palestinians (Bush, 2002). However, given the 
unequal balance of power that exists between the two sides, Israel has always been assured to 
prevail in direct talks with the Palestinians. The two states plan, as presented by the 
administration in terms of its content and procedures, would indeed results in forcing 
Palestinians to create isolated ghettos in areas that are proportionally smaller than what the 
international community would have expected from an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 
borders. As such, Bush’s rhetorical backing of a Palestinian state would not be expected to 
create a viable, territorially continuous and contiguous Palestinian state. Israel’s construction 
of facts on the grounds, including its wall that “is designed to surround a truncated Palestine 
completely, and a network of exclusive highways…cut across what is left of Palestine” is not 
consistent with his two states vision (Carter, 2007). These policies are more consistent with 
the creation of a Palestinian permanent Bantustan that Israel has been trying to establish for 
decades (Mohamad, 2001). Some argued that, irrespective of whether Bush’s vision is 
genuine or not, the actual realities in the occupied territories reveal that it might be 
impossible to implement the two states plan given that the Palestinians are sharing their land 
with an increasing population of Jewish settlers. Such reality highlights the importance of the 
one democratic state idea (Karmi, 2007). 
Bush’s plans for democracy promotion across the Middle East yielded other unexpected 
results, which raised more doubts about his legacy on the peace process, namely after the 
election victory of Hamas in the Palestinian territories (Zakaria, 2006). For its part, the Bush 
Administration has not been willing to accept Palestinians’ electoral choices due to Israel’s 
rejection of the outcomes of the 2006 elections, which were used as a pretext to reject the 
Palestinian state idea, and strengthen the Israeli government’s pursuit of more unilateral 
policies and disengagement plans in the Palestinian territories.  
 
2.2 The Road Map Formula 
 
The Quartet’s Road Map formula has become part of the U.S. attempt to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its revelation in April 2003 coincided with Sharon’s reelection 
and Abu Mazen’s appointment as Palestinian Prime Minister, both in the same year. Parallel 
to Bush’s vision, the Road Map formula consists of various steps that were intended to lead 
to a negotiated agreement between Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of the two states 
solution (New York Times, Nov.15, 2002). From the start, the Road Map faced challenges 
similar to those that related to Bush’s two states idea, notably regarding the Israeli claim of 
the lack of a Palestinian peace partner. Although the Road Map could have been pursued 
following Arafat’s death and Palestinians’ legislative election, Israel’s focus on its 
disengagement plans stalled the peace process.  
The first phase of the Road Map formula expected the Palestinians to halt their Intifada, 
address Israel’s security needs and make serious efforts to prevent attacks on Israelis. Before 
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negotiations resume, the PA was particularly expected to confiscate weapons and dismantle 
the infrastructure of militias and begin consolidating security forces under a unified 
command structure acceptable for the U.S. and Israel. Faced with this situation, coupled with 
the absence of details about the future peace settlement, the PA would run the risk of a low 
intensity civil war in the territories if and when it tries to disarm militant Palestinian groups 
that consider themselves part of a legitimate resistance forces to Israel’s military occupation 
of the Palestinian territories. Although Israel was asked to remove its settlements and ease 
travel restrictions on Palestinians, it failed to do so. Despite the challenges, the U.N. special 
coordinator, Terje Roed-Larsen, was, in 2003, optimistic in his assessment of the PA’s and 
Israel’s tasks to meet the Quartet expectations. He believed that the PA is determined to 
rebuild its “security services into a unified and reliable force” along with “combating terror 
and collecting illegal weapons.” On the settlements issue, Roed-Larsen also thought that 
Israel was serious about “removing West Bank outposts” along with easing “the daily 
suffering of the Palestinian civilians,” and eventually accomplishing its full military 
withdrawal to the line of September 2000” (Roed-Larsen, 2003).  
The Road Map’s second phase entailed the formation of a provisional Palestinian state 
that lacks identifiable boundaries and sovereignty. Palestinians feared that such a state might 
remain permanently provisional. The provisional state was also expected to emerge within a 
year and a half following the implementation of the first phase. The third phase would be 
considered the most difficult, where the focus will be centered on final status issues such as 
borders, refugees, settlements, security, statehood and Jerusalem. A major concern at this 
phase was the expected repeat of the collapse of the Camp David II talks, where Israel and 
the U.S. blamed Arafat for the failure of the summit (Malley and Agha, 2001). Although the 
PA failed to accomplish its duties as part of the Road Map, Israel also failed as it continued 
to construct its settlement plans and erected the separation wall with no regard to the 1967 
boundaries. Israel also failed to remove newly created settlements in the territories, referred 
by Israel only as unauthorized outposts, and continued to restrict the movement of 
Palestinians throughout the occupied territories. The third phase was meant to finalize an 
agreement by May 2005, declaring an end to the conflict. Instead of reaching a settlement, 
and under the justification of its security concerns, Israel pursued uncoordinated unilateral 
steps in an attempt to determine its version of the final status negotiations, while Palestinians 
continue to live under the difficulties of the status quo situation.  
Obviously, the failure of the peace process placed the Palestinians at more disadvantages 
than the Israelis, given that the Palestinians continue to live under dreadful economic, 
political and social conditions. The absence of U.S. pressure on Israel did little to hinder 
Israel’s plans for the occupied territories, including its expansion of existing colonial 
settlements along with creating new ones. The Bush Administration manipulated the process 
and provided diplomatic support and maneuverings for the Road Map, thus excluding the 
Quartet’s other members from doing their part. Despite its many problems, the two states 
idea still enjoys international and regional legitimacy more than all other plans. Although 
Palestinians continue to support the two states solution, the realities on the ground are more 
measured by their failure to improve their deteriorating status quo. 
 
2.3 Contesting Bush’s Peace Efforts 
 
The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 came as a Palestinian response to the failure 
of the peace process and continuation of Israel’s military occupation of their territories. 





Obviously, until a more viable peace plan is reached and implemented, the PA will likely 
remain unable to reform itself and the Israeli-Palestinian violence will continue to escalate. 
For its part, Bush’s two states plan has failed to establish the foundation for a successful 
peace deal that could satisfy the minimal claims of the Palestinian side. Bush’s endorsement 
of the Road Map formula also failed to deliver for the Palestinians and thus suffered from 
challenges similar to those that confronted his initial peace efforts. Indeed, the Oslo process 
as a whole, which started since 1993, was a setback in peacemaking as it deprived 
Palestinians of their internationally recognized claims while helping Israel to build its own 
projects of Bantustanisation in the Palestinian occupied territories (Guyatt, 1998). The failure 
of the Camp David II Summit in 2000, accompanied by the absence of new and more viable 
alternative peace models from the agendas of the negotiators, along with their mediators, also 
resulted in furthering tensions surrounding Palestinian-Israeli relations. Consistent with the 
Oslo framework, Bush’s plan and that of the Road Map’s formula expected the Palestinians 
to settle for and accept incremental gains. The failure of such peace plans along with the 
absence of peace in general in the area largely rests on the inequality between Israel and the 
Palestinians, along with the lack of an impartial third-party mediator. As the U.S. demanded 
more from the Palestinians than from Israel, it placed the blame for the escalating violence 
on the victims rather than the victimizers. In its current content, structure and procedures, the 
peace process maintains Israel’s favorable place in relation to talks with the Palestinians and 
mediations with the U.S.   
Although the Road Map has been viewed as the best U.S. approved offer for a solution, 
the lack of essential details about the future settlement and the means of enforcement to 
create a viable and sovereign Palestinian state alongside the Green Line boundaries challenge 
its implementation. Israel and the PA may share the blame for the failure of the Road Map, 
but the U.S.’s refusal to pressure Israel into agreeing to withdraw to the 1967 borders 
remains the main cause for the failure. The Bush Administration’s approach to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has been based mainly on matters concerning Israel’s security without 
considerations for Palestinians’ claims, including their need for security as well. This 
marginalization of the Palestinians by existing “politico-economic arrangement that 
suppresses their freedom” in their territories did little to entice the Bush Administration into 
enforcing the two states idea (Fernandez, 2005). Bush’s vision and the Road Map may have 
intended to bring moderations in the political stance assumed by both sides and thus arrive at 
a negotiated end for the conflict. However, the content of Bush’s plan contradicts such 
message. Bush plan asked almost nothing from the Israel government, which makes it a one-
sided vision (Veliotes, 2002:11-12). 
Bush’s two states vision along with the Road Map formula seems to have been motivated 
by a combination of established legacies in the U.S. towards the conflict on the one hand, 
and by new changes in Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians on the other. The Bush 
Administration’s hands-off approach towards Sharon allowed Israel to crack down on the 
Palestinian resistance with an unprecedented force. Unable to crush the Intifada, the Sharon 
government began pursuing its long-term unilateral plans that complemented Bush’s 
provisional Palestinian state idea, where Palestine may never become a sovereign state. The 
Bush Administration also backed Israel’s “unilateral physical separation from the 
Palestinians” and accepted Israel’s “building and armed patrolling of a country-long security 
fence dividing Palestinian areas from Israeli ones” (Unger, 2002: 1-2). Bush’s conduct, 
which contradicted his stated vision at the time, has obviously been inconsistent with 
attempts to create a Palestinian state. Bush appears more willing to support the creation of a 
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restricted “Palestinian entity that falls short of the attributes of statehood” (Umger, 2002,: 6). 
Although the U.S. called upon the Palestinians to exercise their democratic rights to free 
themselves from their old leadership, the Bush Administration has contributed, after Hamas’s 
electoral victory, into destabilizing the PA and in penalizing the Palestinians for choosing 
leaders that were not acceptable for the U.S. and Israel. Hamas’s victory was also used as a 
pretext to “deepen Israelis’ inclination toward unilateralism in their relations with the 
Palestinians” (Herzog, 2006).  
Bush’s two states idea may have also been influenced by events surrounding the Iraq war. 
The U.S.’s ability to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a satisfactory way for both 
sides would have perhaps preserved much of the U.S.’s long-term interests and credibility 
across the region. Initially, Bush had to support the Road Map as a means to “contain Arab 
ferment” over the U.S. war in Iraq (Mandel, 2004: 3). Given his pursuit of unilateralism 
during the preparation for the Iraq war, which alienated many across the world, the Bush 
Administration believed that the Road Map might provide them with the chance to appear 
more cooperative with the U.N. and the E.U. on the peace process, which would 
consequently enhance the status of U.S. autocratic Arab allies in the region.  
As far as the underlying forces that may have determined the course of Bush’s policies 
towards Israel and the Palestinians are concerned, pro-Israel lobbyists, Protestant 
evangelicals and the neo-conservative camp were by far the most important influencers on 
Bush’s foreign policy agenda. Pressures from domestic forces that support Israel and 
consider Arab claims to be risk free have guided Bush’s policies throughout the region. John 
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt singled out the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) because of its ability “to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American 
national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that 
U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006). Although 
the American Jewish community is by no means a homogeneous group, the AIPAC has 
succeeded in pressuring the Bush Administration to follow Israel’s lead in peace talks. The 
two states idea has accordingly been hindered by the success of the pro-Israel lobby (Rosner, 
2006). 
Protestant evangelical groups in the U.S. have also exerted tremendous influence on the 
Bush Administration and have succeeded in placing Israel’s interests at the forefront of U.S. 
foreign policy agenda. The evangelicals’ vital political base has motivated many of the Bush 
Administration’s policies towards Iraq, Israel and the Muslim world. Their support for Israel 
is based on biblical accounts that are reflective of deep affinity with the Jewish state and the 
Holy Land. Known as Christian Zionists, a majority of them assume that as the world nears 
to an end, the Church, comprised of Christians, will be ruptured into heaven leaving behind 
those who have not been saved (Mohamad, 2009). To accelerate this process, they believe 
that Solomon’s temple must be rebuilt in modern day Jerusalem at the location of the Dome 
of the Rock (Al-Aqsa Mosque). Aside from having anticipated the creation of Israel, they 
also believe that the Jewish state will deliver for them their other theological prophecies 
(Amos, 2003). While awaiting the second coming of Jesus Christ to occur, evangelicals 
continue to pressure U.S. policymakers to preserve Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel. 
They predict more warfare to emerge in the Holy Land, notably on the site of Armageddon 
(Megiddo) where the anti-Christ will be defeated and the Messiah will emerge from heaven 
to end evil and set up a paradise on earth. Being a vital electoral constituency, Bush is 
influenced by their views that reject imposing territorial compromises upon Israel. Among 
others, Christian evangelicals’ impact on the U.S.–Israeli relations assumed that Bush’s 





presidency “has resulted in a new importance for the relationship between evangelicals and 
U.S. foreign policy” establishment, namely in the period that followed the events of the 11
th
 
of September 2001” (Durham, 2004). 
Although not all Protestant evangelicals subscribe to these beliefs, politicians and 
religious figures like Ralph Reed, Kay Arthur, Jane Hanson, Gary Bauer and Pat Robertson, 
along with many members of Congress such as Richard Army, Tom Delay and James Inhoff, 
to mention a few, have been candid about their religious beliefs and political support for 
Israel on religious grounds. They generally believe that any position taken against Israel is a 
stand against God, who they believe purposefully lead the Jews to the Holy Land (Hyer, 
1982: 6; Claiborne, 1981: 11). They support Israel’s “expansionist agenda” and they believe 
that to do otherwise “would be contrary to God’s will” (Mersheimer and Walt, 2006).
 
These 
followers have expressed a romanticized view of Israel not just because it was the place 
where Jesus was born and had been resurrected, but also because of prophesies that are 
believed to be linked to Israel’s creation. Although evangelicals supported Bush’s policies 
across the Middle East region, many of them have opposed his backing of the Road Map 
formula for peace. Pat Robertson, for instance, warned Bush that his support for the Road 
Map defies God (Durham, 2004: 152). 
However, it may be too simplistic to assume that evangelicalism is the only, or perhaps 
the most important, driving force behind Bush’s policies towards Israel and the Palestinians. 
Along with the pro-Israel lobby, the neo-conservative elements in the administration have 
played a more significant role in urging Bush to grant Israel all the freedom it needs to 
combat Palestinian violence and preserve its security concerns at all costs. Not just in the 
case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, neo-conservatism has widely been identified as the 
main driving force behind Bush’s policies worldwide. Supporters and critics of Bush 
consider his democracy promotion project, the Iraq war, his pro-Israel policy and the 
emphasis on U.S.’s hegemony in world affairs as integral parts of the neo-conservative 
strategy that motivates Bush’s foreign policies in both terms in office. Neo-conservatives 
have supported Bush’s doctrine on preemptive and unilateral exercises of U.S. power in 
world affairs (Hurst, 2005). In the case of Iraq, and perhaps the rest of the Arab and Muslim 
region, neo-conservatives have come to assume that Arabs understand only the language of 
force, and that they need the U.S. more than the U.S. needs them.  
Bush’s two states plan faced serious problems relating to implementation, especially 
since it is only one among other, often conflicting, goals that the U.S. has been trying to 
achieve in the region. Bush’s style is another challenge that often hindered his vision. His 
reference to biblical concepts in scripted speeches has not only led to the construction of 
Arabs and Muslims as enemies in the minds of Americans, but has also increased anti-
Americanism across the region (Merskin, 2004). The U.S. also suffered from engaging itself 
in devising policies on the Palestinians and the region that are based less on true knowledge 
and more originated in the conventional wisdom and the frame of reference that favors Israel 
against the Palestinians (Christison, 2001).  
The failure to pursue Bush’s two states vision and the Road Map formula have not only 
shifted debates towards focusing on whether a Palestinian state can be established or not, but 
also on debates concerning the size and nature of a future Palestinian state. Skepticism about 
the viability of the two states solution particularly enticed discussions on alternative 
solutions, including those that envision Jews and Arabs living together in a one state setting. 
It is becoming more obvious that an alternative scenario to the two states formula would be 
the formation of a single democratic state. The one-state idea, known as binationalism, 
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entails political equality between Arabs and Jews (Said, 1999: 31). Although it is perhaps the 
most just scenario for a political settlement, binationalism remains an unlikely approach for 
conflict resolution for both sides. Although most Palestinians continue to support coexistence 
with Israel within a two-state setting, almost a quarter of the adult population in the West 
Bank and Gaza support a binational state. In the end, no matter what political settlement is 
pursued, the Palestinians have succeeded in canceling out plans that aimed at transferring 
them out of their land (Finkelstein, 2003).  
The electoral victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council’s election placed 
more obstacles facing current Israeli-Palestinian relations. By opposing Hamas’s success in 
the election, the Bush Administration has repeated past mistakes that were made during the 
1991 Algerian elections when it stood, along with European countries- notably France, 
against Islamists who had won election (Mohamad, 2000). In opposing the inclusion of 
Hamas in the political process, the administration has not only hindered the prospect for the 
group to moderate itself, but also strengthened authoritarian Arab regimes’ arguments 
warning that democracy promotion in the region only benefits Islamists, given that Islamists 
are usually the most popular groups and well-organized groups in the Arab world to win an 
election (Zambelis, 2005: 92). Bush’s policies towards Hamas represented a fundamental 
continuity to the U.S.’s legacy that had opposed the choices of the Algerian people, which 
was justified on the grounds that Islamists are “anti-democratic in orientation” and, as U.S. 
diplomat Edward Djerjian believed, that Islamists have a tendency to utilize the “one man, 
one vote, one time” formula to establish “legitimately elected Islamist governments” 
(Cofman, 2004: 64). 
Hamas’s victory has also led many politicians into criticizing the Bush Administration’s 
pressures upon the PA to carry out the elections, despite expectations that Hamas’s strength 
matches that of Fatah. Domestic pressure on the Bush Administration has entailed the 
boycotting of the new PA’s government along with reinforcing Hamas as a terrorist 
organization (Weisman, 2006). Congress, for instance, issued a new “legislation that would 
tighten restrictions on U.S. contacts and aid,” with the Hamas government. The House of 
Representatives had previously passed resolution 575, “which asserts that Hamas and other 
terrorist organizations should not participate in elections held by the Palestinian Authority” 
(McArther, 2006). The pro-Israel’s lobby and the members of Congress fear that pressure on 
the administration, which may derive from Bush’s Arab allies, may lead to the buildup of a 
working relationship between the U.S. and Hamas. These concerns were raised after the 
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Hamas’s representatives in Moscow in March 
2006. Congress and the Bush Administration agreed to cut off financial aid to the Palestinian 
government, and objected to all “dealings with Hamas unless it renounces violence, disarm 
and recognizes Israel” (Richter, 2006). The administration also dispatched Secretary of State 
Rice to the region in order to discourage Arab countries from providing a Hamas led- 
government with aid, unless the group meets the U.S.’s demands and pursue a moderate 
strategy that is acceptable for Israel and the Bush Administration. Bush’s insistence that 
Hamas accepts these conditions “or suffer a cutoff” of aid to the Palestinians, which is 
reflective of the strength of pro-Israel’s lobbyists, is, once again, “short-sighted,” 











3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
 
This essay intended to explore the George W. Bush Administration’s two-state vision and 
the Road Map formula as one of the failed frameworks for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Although the two plans marked a new shift in U.S. policy on Israeli-Palestinian 
relations, the U.S. has been unsuccessful to exercise its leverage to establish peace between 
the two sides. While favouring Israel, often at all costs, Bush’s policy on the Palestinians, 
Iraq and the war on terror has been heavily criticized across the world, and consequently 
intensified Arab and Muslim public resentment of the U.S. and its allies. Although Bush has 
initiated and advanced U.S. policy in favor of the two states option, he at the same time 
undermined the process by insisting that the Palestinians must meet Israel’s security 
standards, elect a new leadership and establish democratic institutions before realizing their 
statehood status. The administration went to the extreme in indicating that democratic 
changes across the Arab region are also essential for creating a Palestinian state that would 
be peaceful and friendly towards Israel. President Bush has, on various occasions, stressed 
that Israel have the right to use force by all means necessary against what he labeled as acts 
of Palestinian terrorism. While referring to Israel’s Prime Minister Sharon as a “man of 
peace,” Bush labeled the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat as a failed and a terrorist figure that 
must be removed from power.  
Based on his two renowned speeches in Turkey and Egypt, President Obama promised to 
improve relations between the U.S. and the Arab and Muslim world. While campaigning in 
2008, he stated that he would dramatically shift U.S. foreign policy towards resolving the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the bases of the two states idea and satisfy the minimal claims 
of the two sides. He criticized Bush for “neglecting to launch any major effort to resolve the 
[Israeli-Palestinian] conflict until the last year of its two-term presidency” (Feldman and 
Shikaki, 2009: 3). Obama also criticized Bush for overreacting to the events of September 11, 
2001, especially with regard to the launching and handling of the Iraq war. On the peace 
process, Obama differed only in style, but not in real substance, from Bush’s policies. In his 
conduct, there was an “evident absence of any plan to follow up on the Cairo speech with 
equally dramatic concrete steps” that could bring about peace in the region (Feldman and 
Shikaki, 2009: 4). President Obama insisted initially on halting Israel’s settlement activities 
as a precondition for the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Faced 
with criticisms from the pro-Israeli groups in the country, Obama was pressured to abandon 
his request on the settlements freeze, and supported Bush’s one-sided approach to the two 
states solution.  
More substantial shifts from Bush’s policy were noticed in Obama's speeches and 
conducts regarding the war on terror. Contrary to Bush’s policy, Obama assumes that the 
scope of the war on terror should have been more limited to, and focused on, al-Qaeda rather 
than Iraq. This has been a typical criticism of Bush’s handling of the war on terror, utilized to 
justify Obama’s focus on setting up an exit strategy from Iraq. However, while Bush’s policy 
had authorized the use of drones against Al-Qaida, Obama expanded the use of such drone 
programs into other countries, notably Yemen and Pakistan. Although President Bush was 
the one who initiated an open-ended war and one-size-fits-all strategy against Islamists, the 
Obama administration revised Bush’s broad strategy into a more specific one that 
emphasizes the “war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and [other] associated forces,” including 
the Islamic State of the Levant (ISL) in recent years (Sterio, 2012: 202). The most significant 
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departure from Bush’s policies assumed by the Obama administration has been the issue of 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Contrary to Bush’s rigid approach to Iran, Obama expressed a 
strategy based on conducting direct negotiations with Iranian officials. Although Obama 
remains committed to the principle held by Bush that insists on disallowing Iran from ever 
acquiring nuclear weapons, Bush’s approach to Iran was identical to the Israeli perspective 
that objected to negotiations as a means to deter Iran from pursuing or acquiring nuclear 
weapons (Chomsky and Achcar, 2011). In so doing, Israel, backed by the Bush 
Administration, intended to remain the only hegemonic power in the region, a status that 
could indeed be shared and/or threatened by Iran if and when it develops nuclear weapons 
capabilities. In the past two years, Israeli officials continue to voice discontents with 
Obama’s lenient approach towards Iran. 
Obama’s policy regarding peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and to 
a lesser degree his handling of the war on terror, represents more of a continuation of, rather 
than a conflict with, the policies of the Bush Administration. Both Presidents believed that 
the prospect for a final settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be reached through 
direct negotiations between the two parties themselves, which evidently places the 
Palestinians at an unending disadvantaged situation. While Bush blamed the PA in general, 
and Arafat in particular, for obstructing the establishment of a Palestinian state, Obama 
condemned Hamas as a terrorist group that obstructs peace and security for Israel and the 
Palestinians alike (Siegman, 2010). On Israeli-Palestinian relations, it is typical for U.S. 
policymakers, and advisors, in this context, to blame the Palestinians for the failure of 
negotiations. With the exception of recent, largely personal, tensions between Obama and 
Netanyahu, little or no criticisms have ever been made publically by either of the two 
presidents towards Israel’s policies, including its military occupation of the Palestinian 
territories. Indeed, the continuation of Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank and its 
embargo against Gaza remains the main obstacle facing the future of peace between the two 
sides and across the region. The recent reelection of Netanyahu for a second term as Israel’s 
Prime Minister, coupled with his ongoing political tension with President Obama (often 
viewed as personal) over Iran’s nuclear issue and, to a lesser degree, with regard to the 
Palestinian state idea has further complicated the prospect for peacemaking between Israel 
and the Palestinians. Israeli politicians have been very vocal in their critique of the Obama 
Administration (Oren, 2015). Blaming the Palestinians has been a risk-free situation for U.S. 
policymakers, regardless to their partisan affiliations, namely when catering to domestic 
factors that influences the dynamics of U.S. politics. 
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